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Security Assessment of Electricity Distribution
Networks under DER Node Compromises
Devendra Shelar and Saurabh Amin
Abstract—This article focuses on the security assessment
of electricity Distribution Networks (DNs) with vulnerable
Distributed Energy Resource (DER) nodes. The adversary
model is simultaneous compromise of DER nodes by strategic
manipulation of generation set-points. The loss to the defender
(DN operator) includes loss of voltage regulation and cost of
induced load control under supply-demand mismatch caused
by the attack. A 3-stage Defender-Attacker-Defender (DAD)
game is formulated: in Stage 1, the defender chooses a security
strategy to secure a subset of DER nodes; in Stage 2, the
attacker compromises a set of vulnerable DERs and injects
false generation set-points; in Stage 3, the defender responds by
controlling loads and uncompromised DERs. Solving this trilevel
optimization problem is hard due to nonlinear power flows
and mixed-integer decision variables. To address this challenge,
the problem is approximated by a tractable formulation based
on linear power flows. The set of critical DER nodes and
the set-point manipulations characterizing the optimal attack
strategy are computed. An iterative greedy approach to compute
attacker-defender strategies for the original nonlinear problem
is proposed. These results provide guidelines for optimal secu-
rity investment and defender response in pre- and post-attack
conditions, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
Integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) such as
solar photovoltaic (PV) and solar thermal power generation
with electricity distribution networks (DNs) is a major aspect
of smart grid development. Some reports estimate that, by
2050, solar PVs will contribute up to 23.7 % of the total
electricity generation in the US. Large-scale deployment of
DERs can be utilized to improve grid reliability, reduce
dependence on bulk generators (especially, during peak de-
mand), and decrease network losses (at least, up to a certain
penetration level) [1]. Harnessing these capabilities requires
secure and reliable operation of cyber-physical components
such as smart inverters, DER controllers, and communication
network between DERs and remote control centers. Thus,
reducing security risks is a crucial aspect of the design and
operation of DNs [2]–[6]. This article focuses on the problem
of security assessment of DNs under threats of DER node
disruptions by a malicious adversary.
We are specifically interested in limiting the loss of voltage
regulation and supply-demand mismatch that can result from
Manuscript submitted on August 3, 2016
Mailing address: Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue 1-241,
Cambridge, MA 02139 USA (e-mail: shelard,amins@mit.edu, phone:
857-253-8964).
This work was supported by EPRI grant for “Modeling the Impact of
ICT Failures on the Resilience of Electric Distribution Systems” (contract
ID: 10000621), and NSF project “FORCES” (award #: CNS-1239054).
the simultaneous compromise of multiple DERs nodes on a
distribution feeder. It is well known that the active power
curtailment and reactive power control are two desirable
capabilities that can help maintain the operational require-
ments in DNs with large-scale penetration of DERs with
intermittent nature [1], [7], [8]. We investigate the specific
ways in which these capabilities need to be built into the DER
deployment designs, and show that properly chosen security
strategies can protect DNs against a class of security attacks.
Our work is motivated by recent progress in three topics:
(T1) Interdiction and cascading failure analysis of power
grids (especially, transmission networks) [9]–[11]; (T2)
Cyber-physical security of networked control systems [2]–
[5], [12], [13]; and (T3) Optimal power flow (OPF) and
control of distribution networks with DERs [1], [8], [14].
Existing work in (T1) employs state-of-the-art computa-
tional methods for solving large-scale, mixed integer pro-
grams for interdiction/cascade analysis of transmission net-
works assuming direct-current (DC) power flow models.
Since our focus is on security assessment of DNs, we also
need to model reactive power demand, in addition to the
active power flows. In this work, we consider standard DN
model with constant power loads and DERs [8], [14], but
we restrict our attention to tree networks. This enables us
to obtain structural results on optimal attack strategies. We
show that these structural results also provide guidelines for
investment in deploying IT security solutions, especially in
geographically diverse DNs.
The adversary model in this paper considers simultane-
ous DER node compromises by false-data injection attacks.
Thanks to the recent progress in (T2), similar models have
been proposed for a range of cyber-physical systems [3],
[4]. Our model is motivated by the DER failure scenarios
proposed by power system security experts [15]. These sce-
narios consider shutdown of DER systems when an external
threat agent compromises the DERs by a direct attack, or
by manipulating the power generation set-points sent from
the control center to individual DER nodes/controllers; see
Fig. 1. Indeed, the security threats to DNs are real. The
recent cyber attack on Ukraine’s power grid shows that an
external attacker can compromise multiple DN components
by exploiting commonly known IT vulnerabilities [16]. An-
other real-world attack that is directly related to the attack
model introduced in this paper was highlighted in a 2015
Congressional Research Service report [17]. This attack was
conducted by computer hackers to obtain a back-door entry to
the grid. They exploited the IT systems that enable integration
of DERs/renewable energy sources.
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Fig. 1: Illustration of the DER failure scenario proposed
in [15] on a modified IEEE 37-node network.
In our model, the attacker’s objective is to impose loss of
voltage regulation to the defender (i.e., network operator),
and also induce him to exercise load control in order to
reduce the supply-demand mismatch immediately after the
attack. The defender’s primary concern in post-attack condi-
tions is to reduce the costs due to loss of voltage regulation
and load control. Hence, in our model, the line losses are
assigned a relatively lesser weight. For a fixed attack, solving
for a defender response via load control and control of
uncompromised DERs is similar to the recent results in (T3),
i.e., using convex relaxations of the OPF problem.
Our main contribution is analysis of a three-stage sequen-
tial security game posed in § II. In Stage 1, the defender
invests in securing a subset of DER nodes but cannot ensure
security of all nodes due to his budget constraint; in Stage 2,
the resource-constrained attacker compromises a subset of
vulnerable DER nodes and manipulates their set-points; in
Stage 3, the defender responds by regulating the supply-
demand mismatch. This defender-attacker-defender (DAD)
game models both strategic investment decisions (Stage 1)
and operation of DN during attacker-defender interaction
(Stages 2-3). Solving the DAD game is a hard problem due
to the nonlinear power flow, DER constraints, and mixed-
integer decision variables.
In Sec. III, we provide tractable approximations of the sub-
game induced for a fixed defender security strategy, i.e., the
attacker-defender interaction in Stages 2-3; see Theorem 1.
These approximations can be efficiently solved, and hold
under the assumption of no reverse power flows, small
impedances, and small line losses. Next we show structural
results for the master-problem (i.e., optimal attack for fixed
defender response), and the sub-problem (i.e., optimal de-
fender response for fixed attack). For the master-problem,
we derive the false set-points that the attacker will introduce
in any compromised DER (Theorem 2), and also propose
computational methods to solve for attack vectors, i.e., DER
nodes whose compromise will cause maximum loss to the
defender (Propositions 3 and 4). For the sub-problem, we
utilize the convex relaxations of OPF to compute optimal
defender response for a fixed attack (Lemma 3), and under
a restricted set of conditions, provide a range of new set-
points for the uncompromised DERs (Proposition 2). These
results lead to a greedy approach, which efficiently computes
the optimal attack and defender response (Algorithm 3).
We prove optimality of the greedy approach for DNs with
identical resistance-to-reactance ratio (Theorem 3), and show
that the approach efficiently obtains optimal attack strategy
and defender response for a broad range of conditions (§ V).
Thanks to the structural results on optimal attack strategy,
our greedy approach has significantly better computational
performance than the standard techniques to solve bilevel
optimization problems (e.g., Benders decomposition [10]).
Finally, we provide a characterization of the optimal security
strategy for Stage 1 decision by the defender, albeit for
symmetric DNs (§ IV, Theorem 4).
In the following, the reader should note that the proofs
of Lemmas 1 to 5, Propositions 1 to 6 and Theorem 4 are
provided in the online supplementary material [18].
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Distribution network model
We summarize the standard network model of radial
electric distribution systems [8], [19], [20]. Consider a tree
network of nodes and distribution lines G “ pN Y t0u, Eq,
where N denotes the set of all nodes except the substation
(labeled as node 0), and let N :“ |N |. Let Vi P C denote
the complex voltage at node i, and νi :“ |Vi|2 denote the
square of voltage magnitude. We assume that the magnitude
of substation voltage |V0| is constant. Let Ij P C denote the
current flowing from node i to node j on line pi, jq P E ,
and `j :“ |Ij |2 the square of the magnitude of the current.
A distribution line pi, jq P E has a complex impedance
zj “ rj`jxj , where rj ą 0 and xj ą 0 denote the resistance
and inductance of the line pi, jq, respectively, and j “ ?´1.
The voltage regulation requirements of the DN under
nominal no attack conditions govern that:
@ i P N , νi ď νi ď νi, (1)
where νi “ |V i|2 and νi “
∣∣V i∣∣2 are the soft lower and
upper bounds for maintaining voltage quality at node i.
Additionally, voltage magnitudes under all conditions satisfy:
@ i P N , µ ď νi ď µ, (2)
where µ and µ are the hard voltage safety bounds for any
nodal voltage, and 0 ă µ ă miniPN νi ď maxiPN νi ă µ.
1) Load model: We consider constant power loads [21].
1 Let sci :“ pci ` jqci denote the power consumed by
a load at node i, where pci and qci are the real and
reactive components. Let scnomi :“ pcnomi ` jqcnomi denote
the nominal power demanded by a node i, where pcnomi
1We do not consider frequency dependent loads as our analysis is limited
to attacks that do not cause disturbances in system frequency; see § II-D
for our justification of constant system frequency assumption.
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and qcnomi are the real and reactive components of sc
nom
i .
Under our assumptions, for all i P N , pci ď pcnomi and
qci ď qcnomi , i.e., the actual power consumed at each node
is upper bounded by the nominal demand:
@ i P N , sci ď scnomi . (3)
2) DER model: 2 Let sgi :“ pgi ` jqgi denote the power
generated by the DER connected to node i, where pgi and qgi
denote the active and reactive power, respectively. Following
[14], [8], sgi is bounded by the apparent power capability
of the inverter, which is a given constant spi. We denote the
DER set-point by spi “ Repspiq`jImpspiq, where Repspiq
and Impspiq are the real and reactive components. The power
generated at each node is constrained as follows:
@ i P N , sgi ď spi P Si, (4)
where Si :“ tspi P C | Repspiq ě 0 and |spi| ď spiu.
S :“śiPN Si denotes the set of configurable set-points.
We denote the net power consumed at node i by si :“
sci ´ sgi. A DN can be fully specified by the tuple
xG, |V0| , z, scnom, spy, where z, scnom, sp are row vectors of
appropriate dimensions, and are assumed to be constant.
3) Power flow equations: The 3-phase balanced nonlinear
power flow (NPF) on line pi, jq P E is given by [19]:
Sj “ řk:pj,kqPE Sk ` scj ´ sgj ` zj`j (5a)
νj “ νi ´ 2Repz¯jSjq ` |zj |2 `j (5b)
`j “ |Sj |
2
νi
, (5c)
where Sj “ Pj ` jQj denotes the complex power flowing
from node i to node j on line pi, jq P E , and z¯ is the complex
conjugate of z; (5a) is the power conservation equation; (5b)
relates the voltage drop and the power flows; and (5c) is the
current-voltage-power relationship. For the NPF model (5),
we define a state as follows:
x :“ “ν, `, sc, sg, S‰ ,
where x P R2N` ˆ C3N , and ν, `, sc, sg, and S are row
vectors of appropriate dimensions. Let F denote the set of
all states x that satisfy (2), (3), (4) and the NPF model (5),
and define the set of all states with no reverse power flows
(see § II-D for additional assumptions) as follows:
X :“ tx P F |S ě 0u.
The linear power flow (LPF) approximation of (5) is:pSj “ řk:pj,kqPE pSk ` pscj ´ psgj (6a)pνj “ pνi ´ 2Repz¯j pSjq (6b)
p`
j “
∣∣∣pSj∣∣∣2pνi , (6c)
where px :“ rpν, p`, psc, psg, pSs is a state of the LPF model, and
analogous to the NPF model, define the set of LPF states px
with no reverse power flows as pX .
2We use the term DER to denote the complete DER-inverter assembly
attached to a node of DN.
0 a b c i m
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Fig. 2: Precedence description of the nodes for a tree network.
Here, j ăi k, e “i k, b ă k, Pj “ ta, g, ju, Pi X Pj “ tau.
B. Notation and definitions
All vectors are row vectors, unless otherwise stated. For
two vectors c and d, c d d denotes their Hadamard product.
Let Kj :“ rj
xj
be the resistance-to-reactance (r{x) ratio for
line pi, jq P E , and let K and K denote the minimum and
maximum of the Kjs over all pi, jq P E . We say that DERs at
nodes j and k are homogeneous with respect to each other if
their set-point configurations as well as their apparent power
capabilities are identical, i.e., spj “ spk and spj “ spk.
Similarly, two loads at nodes j and k are homogeneous if
scnomj “ scnomk .
For any given node i P N , let Pi be the path from the root
node to node i. Thus, Pi is an ordered set of nodes starting
from the root node and ending at node i, excluding the root
node; see Fig. 2. We say that node j is an ancestor of node k
(j ă k), or equivalently, k is a successor of j iff Pj Ă Pk.
We define the relative ordering ĺi, with respect to a “pivot”
node i as follows:
- j precedes k (j ĺi k) iff Pi X Pj Ď Pi X Pk.
- j strictly precedes k (j ăi k) iff Pi X Pj Ă Pi X Pk.
- j is at the same precedence level as k (j “i k) iff
Pi X Pj “ Pi X Pk.
We define the common path impedance between any two
nodes i, j P N as the sum of impedances of the lines in the
intersection of paths Pi and Pj , i.e., Zij :“ řkPPiXPj zk,
and denote the resistive (real) and inductive (imaginary)
components of Zij by Rij and Xij , respectively.
Finally, we define some useful terminology for the tree
network G. Let H denote the height of G, and let Nh denote
the set of nodes on level h for h “ 1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , H . For any
node i P N , hi denotes the level of node i; N ci the set of
children nodes of node i; Λi the set of nodes in the subtree
rooted at node i; Λji the set of nodes in the subtree rooted
at node i until level hj , where j P Λi; NL the set of leaf
nodes, i.e., NL :“ tj P N | E k P N s.t. pj, kq P Eu.
C. Defender-Attacker-Defender security game
We consider a 3-stage sequential game between a defender
(network operator) and an attacker (external threat agent).
- Stage 1: The defender chooses a security strategy
u P UB to secure a subset of DERs;
- Stage 2: The attacker chooses from the set of DERs
that were not secured by the defender in Stage 1, and
manipulates their set-points according to a strategy
ψ :“ “spa, δ‰ P ΨMpuq;
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- Stage 3: The defender responds by choosing the set-
points of the uncompromised DERs and, if possible,
impose load control at one or more nodes according
to a strategy φ :“ “spd, γ‰ P Φpu, ψq.
The rDADs game is a sequential game of perfect in-
formation, i.e. each player is perfectly informed about the
actions that have been chosen by the previous players. The
equilibrium concept is the classical Stackelberg equilibrium.
In this game, UB and Φpu, ψq denote the set of defender
actions in Stage 1 and 3, respectively; and ΨMpuq denotes the
set of attacker strategies in Stage 2. Formally, the defender-
attacker-defender rDADs game is as follows:
rDADs L :“ minuPUB maxψPΨM minφPΦ Lpxpu, ψ, φqq (7)
s.t. xpu, ψ, φq P X (8a)
scpu, ψ, φq “ γ d scnom (8b)
sgpu, ψ, φq “ ud spd ` p1N ´ uq
d rδ d spa ` p1N ´ δq d spds, (8c)
where (8b) specifies that the actual power consumed at node i
is equal to the power demand scaled by the corresponding
load control parameter γi P rγi, 1s chosen by the defender.
The constraint (8c) models the net effect of defender
choice ui in Stage 1, the attacker choice pspai , δiq in Stage
2, and the defender choice spdi in Stage 3 on the actual
power generated at node i. Thus, (8c) is the adversary
model of rDADs game: the DER i is compromised if and
only if it was not secured by the defender (ui “ 0) and
was targeted by the attacker (δi “ 1). Specifically, if i is
compromised, spi “ spai , where spai “ Repspai q` jImpspai q
is the false set-point chosen by the attacker. The set-points of
non-compromised DERs are governed by the defender, i.e.,
if DER i is not compromised spi “ spdi .
Note that the physical restriction (4) applies to all DER
nodes, including the compromised ones. If the attacker’s
set-point violates this constraint, it will not be admitted by
the inverter as a valid set-point. Such an attack will not
affect the attack model (8c), and consequently it will not
change the actual power generated by the DER. Also, our
adversary model assumes that the DERs’ power output, sg,
quickly attain the set-points specified by (8c). Thus we do
not consider dynamic set-point tracking. 3
During the nominal operating conditions, the network
operator minimizes the line losses due to power flow on the
distribution lines (LLL). Typical OPF formulations mainly
account for this cost. However, this objective function is
not representative of the loss incurred by operator (defender)
during the aforementioned attack on the DN. We define loss
function in rDADs as follows:
Lpxpu, ψ, φqq :“ LVRpxq ` LLCpxq ` LLLpxq, (9)
3Note that, under this adversary model, the impact of DER compromise
is different than the impact of a natural event, e.g. cloud cover, during
which pg “ 0. The reactive power contribution may be non-negative during
a natural event; however, as we show in § III-C, a compromised DER
contributes reactive power equal to the negative of apparent power capability.
where LVRpxq and LLCpxq model the monetary cost to the
defender due to the loss in voltage regulation and the cost of
load curtailment/shedding (i.e., loss due to partially satisfied
demand), respectively. The term denotes LLL the total line
losses. These costs are defined as follows:
LVRpxq :“ ‖W d pν ´ νq`‖8 (10a)
LLCpxq :“ ‖C d p1´ γq d pcnom‖1 (10b)
LLLpxq :“ ‖r d `‖1 , (10c)
where W,C P RN` . The weight Wi is the cost of unit voltage
bound violation and Ci is the cost of shedding unit load
(or demand dissatisfaction) at node i, and r denotes the
vector of resistances. Note that LVR is the maximum of the
weighted non-negative difference between the lower bound νi
and nodal voltage square νi. We expect that during the attack,
the defender’s primary concern will be to satisfy the voltage
regulation requirements, and minimize the inconvenience to
the customers due to load curtailment. Thus, we assume that
the weights Wi and Ci are chosen such that LLL is relatively
small compared to LVR and LLC.
Note that we added the LLLpxq term in (9) primarily to
ensure that the loss function Lpxq remains strictly convex
function of the net demand s “ sc´ sg. The strict convexity
allows us to have a unique solution for the inner problem for
fixed attacker’s actions. In our computational study in § V,
we choose the weights W and C such that the line loss is
negligible compared to LVR and LLC.
However, more generally, the loss function Lpxq should
reflect the monetary costs incurred by the defender in
maintaining the supply-demand balance and in restoring the
safe operating conditions after the attack. Such a general
model will contain following terms: (a) the cost of supplying
additional power from the substation node to match the
difference between actual power consumed by the loads and
the effective DER generation (LSpxq); (b) the cost due to the
loss of voltage regulation (LVRpxq); (c) the cost of curtailing
or shedding certain loads (LLCpxq); (d) the cost of reactive
power (VAR) control and the cost of energy spillage for
the uncompromised DERs (LACpxq); and (e) the costs of
equipment damage due to the attack (LDpxq).
For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider LACpxq and
LDpxq in our formulation. The choice of ignoring LACpxq can
be justified if we assume that the DER owners participate in
VAR control, perhaps in return of a pre-specified compensa-
tion by the operator/defender. Alternatively, the DERs may
be required to contribute reactive power during contingency
scenarios (i.e., supply-demand mismatch during the attack).
The main difficulty in modeling LDpxq is that it requires
relating the state vector to the probability of equipment
failures. Since our focus is on security assessment of DNs, as
opposed to network reinforcement using investment in phys-
ical protection devices, we ignore this cost in our analysis.
Finally, we also ignore the contribution of LSpxq to the loss
function, as it is likely to be dominated by LVR and LLC.
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Stage 1 [Security Investment]: The set of defender actions
is:
UB :“ tu P t0, 1uN | ‖u‖0 ď Bu,
where B ď |N | denotes a security budget. Since, securing
control-center’s communication to every DER node in a
geographically diverse DN might be costly/impractical, we
impose that the maximum number of nodes the defender can
secure is B. A defender’s choice u P UB implies that a DER
at node i is secure if ui “ 1 (i.e. DER at node i cannot
be compromised), and vulnerable to attack if ui “ 0. Let
Nspuq :“ ti P N |ui “ 1u and Nvpuq :“ N zNspuq denote
the set of secure and vulnerable nodes, for a given u. 4
There are several factors which limit the defender’s ability
to ensure full security of DERs. First, to ensure the security
of control software and network communications that support
DER operations, we need cost-effective and interoperable
security solutions that can be widely adopted by different
entities (e.g., DER manufacturers, service providers, and
owners). Secondly, the DNs are likely to inherit some of
the vulnerabilities of COTS IT devices that may directly
or indirectly affect DER operations. Third, the defenders
(operators) need to justify the business case to deploy se-
curity solutions. Existing work on security investments in
such networked environments, indicates that the operators
tend to underestimate security risks [22]. Consequently, in
the absence of proper regulatory impositions, they tend to
underinvest in well-known security solutions. In our model,
we capture the limitations imposed by these factors by
introducing a security budget B which restricts the maximum
number of nodes the defender can secure in Stage 1.
Stage 2 [Attack]: Let ΨMpuq :“ Spuq ˆ DMpuq denotes
the set of attacker actions for a defender’s choice u, where
Spuq :“śiPNvpuq Si ˆśjPNspuqt0` 0ju
DMpuq :“ tδ P t0, 1uN | δ ď 1N ´ u, ‖δ‖0 ď Mu,
and M ď |Nv| is the maximum number of DERs that
the attacker can compromise. This limit accounts for the
attacker’s resource constraints (and/or restrict his influence
based on his knowledge of DER vulnerabilities). The attacker
simultaneously compromises a subset of vulnerable DER
nodes by introducing incorrect set-points (see the adversary
model (8c)), and increase the loss L (see (9)). The attacker’s
choice is denoted by ψ :“ “spa, δ‰ P ΨMpuq, where spa
denotes the vector of incorrect set-points chosen by the
attacker, and δ P DM denotes the attack vector that indicates
the subset of DERs compromised. A DER at node i is
compromised if δi “ 1, and not compromised if δi “ 0.
We assume that the attacker has full information about
the DN, i.e., she knows xG, |V0| , z, scnom, spy and maximum
4Note that by a “secure” node, we mean that the DER at that node is
not prone to compromise by the attacker. From a practical viewpoint, the
defender can secure a DER node by investing in node security solutions
such as intrusion prevention systems (IPS) [12]. These security solutions
are complementary to the device hardening technologies that can secure
the DER-inverter assembly. Our focus is on security against a threat agent
interested in simultaneously compromising multiple DERs. Thus, we restrict
our attention to node security solutions.
fraction of controllable load at each node. The attacker also
knows the set of DERs secured by the defender in Stage
1 of the game, voltage regulation bounds, and defender’s
cost parameters (i.e. the weight Wi for voltage bound vi-
olation and the cost of unit load shedding Ci for each
node i). By assuming such an informed attacker, we are
able to focus on how the attacker uses the knowledge of the
physical system toward achieving her objective. Thus, we
take a conservative approach and do not explicitly consider
particular mechanisms of how a security vulnerability might
be exploited by the attacker. Admittedly, our attack model
may be unrealistic in some scenarios; however, it allows us
to identify the critical DER nodes, and characterize optimal
security investment and defender response; see Sec. IV.
Next, we justify the attacker’s resource constraint M. First,
the DERs are likely to be heterogeneous in their capacity,
design, and manufacturer type. The attacker may not have
the specific knowledge to exploit vulnerabilities in all DER
systems deployed on a DN. Secondly, in practice, the process
of DER integration is gradual and so is the progress on
implementing security solutions in the control processes that
support DER operations. The attacker’s capability to compro-
mise DERs depends on how the available threat channels vary
which such a technological change. Third, the security of
DNs is likely to be affected by the security practices adopted
by owners of DERs. For example, the attacker’s capability
will be limited if the DER operations are secured by a
regulated distribution utility who faces compliance checks or
mandatory disclosure of known incidents. In contrast, he is
more likely to gain a backdoor entry if the DN has substantial
participation from a variety of third party DER owners who
may not follow prudent security practices. In our analysis, we
model the attacker’s capability by introducing a parameter M,
which is the maximum number of DERs that the attacker can
compromise.
Stage 3 [Defender Response]: Let γ
i
ě 0 denote the
maximum permissible fraction of load control at node i, and
define the set of Stage 3 defender actions:
Φpu, ψq :“ S ˆ Γ,
where Γ :“
ź
iPN
rγ
i
, 1s. The defender chooses new set-points
spd of non-compromised DERs, and load control parameters
γi to reduce the loss L. The defender action is modeled as a
vector φ :“ “spd, γ‰ P Φpu, ψq, where spd (resp. γ) denotes
the vector of spdi (resp. γi).
We make the standard assumption that the defender knows
the nominal demand (i.e., the demand in pre-attack condi-
tions) using measurements collected from the DN nodes.
We also assume that the defender can distinguish between
compromised and non-compromised DERs. In heavy load-
ing conditions, the defender expects the output of a non-
compromised DER to lie in the first quadrant (see Fig. 4 in
§ III-C), i.e. it contributes positive active and reactive power
to the DN. A simple technique to detect compromised DERs
is whether the inverter output lies in the fourth quadrant.
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D. Assumptions about the DN model
In general, rDADs is a non-convex, non-linear, tri-level
optimization problem with mixed-integer decision variables.
Hence, it is a computationally hard problem. Our goals are:
(i) to provide structural insights about the optimal attacker
and defender strategies of the rDADs game;
(ii) to approximate the non-linear (hard) problem by formu-
lating computationally tractable variants based on linear
power flow models.
To address these goals we make the following assumptions:
pA0q0 Voltage quality: In no attack (nominal) conditions,
both X and pX satisfy the voltage quality bounds (1).
pA0q1 Safety: Safety bounds (2) are always satisfied, i.e.,
@ pu, ψ, φq P UB ˆΨˆΦ, @ xpu, ψ, φq P X , µ1N ď ν ď µ1N .
pA0q2 No reverse power flows: Power flows from node
0 towards the downstream nodes, i.e., pS ě 0. This implies
that @ px P pX , pν ď ν01N ; similarly, for NPF model.
pA0q3 Small impedance: All power flows are in the per
unit (p.u.) system, i.e., ν0 “ 1 and @ pi, jq P E , |Sj | ă 1.
Furthermore, the resistances and reactances are small, i.e.,
@ pi, jq P E , rj ď µ
2
4µ` 8 ă 1, xj ď
µ2
4µ` 8 ă 1,
and the common path resistances and reactances are also
smaller than 1, i.e., Rii ď 1 and Xii ď 1 @ i P N .
pA0q4 Small line losses: The line losses are very small
compared to power flows, i.e., @ x P X , zd ` ď 0S, where
0 is a small positive number. 5
pA0q0-pA0q1 are standard assumptions. pA0q2 assumes
that the DER penetration level is such that the net demand
is always positive. In real-world DNs, both rjs and xjs are
typically around 0.01 pA0q3. Also, residential load power
factors (pcj{|scj |) are in range of 0.88-0.95. For these values,
one can show that 0 « 0.05 pA0q4. We will denote pA0q0-
pA0q4 by (A0) .
In addition to the aforementioned assumption, we also
assume that (a) the node 0 is an infinite bus; (b) the voltage
ν0 is constant, and (c) the system frequency is constant.
These assumptions are standard in the steady state power
flow analyses, and can be justified as follows: Our focus is
on the security assessment of DNs that have substation nodes
with high enough ramp rates in supplying „ 50 MW power
(typical for medium-voltage (MV) substations). That is, any
supply-demand imbalance of the order of 50 MW can be
cleared relatively quickly by the substation; hence the infinite
substation bus assumption.
The assumption (b) is typical in OPF formulations and we
make it for the sake of mathematical convenience. Indeed,
as a consequence of attack, there will be a net reduction in
the substation voltage relative to the pre-attack value ν0. This
5Equivalently, 0 is an upper bound on the maximum ratio of
the magnitudes of line losses and the power flows, i.e., 0 “
maxpi,jqPE,Pj‰0,Qj‰0 max
`
rj`j{Pj , xj`j{Qj
˘
. Thus, 0 can be deter-
mined by setting the values of loads to the corresponding nominal demands,
and then computing the line losses and power flows for nominal conditions.
effect is due to a higher net demand after the Stage 3 of the
game. To meet this additional demand, higher currents will
flow through the distribution lines, resulting in even higher
drops in the nodal voltages than what we obtained using
the computational approach detailed in § III-C. Thus, our
estimate of the optimal loss is actually a lower bound on the
true value of optimal loss that the defender would face when
the substation voltage drops after the attack.
To justify assumption (c), we argue that even large-scale
penetration of DERs is not likely to achieve a generation ca-
pacity beyond 50 MW from a single DN. Even in the worst
case, i.e. when all the DERs are simultaneously disconnected,
their impact on the system frequency will be negligible.
Next, we choose  as follows
 :“ p1´ 0q´H ´ 1, (11)
where H is the height of the tree DN and 0 is chosen
as above. Now, consider another linear power flow model
(which we call the -LPF model):qSj “ řk:pj,kqPE qSk ` p1` qp qscj ´ qsgjq (12a)qνj “ qνi ´ 2Repz¯j qSjq (12b)
q`
j “
∣∣∣qSj∣∣∣2qνi , (12c)
and qx :“ ”qν, q`, qsc, qsg, qSı is a state of -LPF model, and qX
is the set of all states qx with no reverse power flows. (Note
that for  “ 0, (12) becomes (6).)
We also note that both LPF and -LPF models ignore the
line losses term zj`j in the power balance equation (5a),
and the term |zj |2 `j in the voltage drop equation (5b). The
power flows obtained by ignoring these terms approximate
the non-linear power flow (NPF) model calculations under
the assumption pA0q3, i.e., the line impedances are very
small |zj | ! 1. Under the assumption pA0q2, i.e. no reverse
power flows, the LPF provides a lower bound on the line
power flows, and an upper bound on the nodal voltages of
the standard DistFlow model [21], [14]. The main use of
-LPF model is that it provides an upper bound on the line
power flows and a lower bound on the nodal voltages; see
Proposition 1 in § III-A.
We will consider two variants of the rDADs game (7)-(8):
rzDADs pL :“ minuPUB maxψPΨM minφPΦ pLppxpu, ψ, φqq
s.t. pxpu, ψ, φq P pX , (8b), (8c),
and
r~DADs qL :“ minuPUB maxψPΨM minφPΦ qLpqxpu, ψ, φqq
s.t. qxpu, ψ, φq P qX , (8b), (8c),
where pLppxq :“ LVRppxq ` LLCppxq, and qLpqxq :“ LVRpqxq `
LLCpqxq are the loss functions for rzDADs and r~DADs, respec-
tively. Note that the loss functions pL and qL do not have the
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line losses term. The optimal loss L of rzDADs and r~DADs
are denoted by pL and qL, respectively. Our results in §III-
IV show that (a) rzDADs (resp. r~DADs) help provide under
(resp. over) approximation of rDADs; and (b) the derivation
of structural properties of optimal strategies in both rzDADs
and r~DADs is analogous to one another.
We will, henceforth, abuse the notation, and use Ψ and Φ
to denote ΨMpuq and Φpu, ψq, respectively. For a summary
of notations, see Table II in the Appendix.
III. ATTACKER-DEFENDER SUB-GAME
In this section, we consider the sub-game (Stages 2 and 3)
induced by a fixed defender security strategy u in Stage 1:
rADs Lu :“ maxψPΨ minφPΦ Lpxpu, ψ, φqq s.t. (8)
Analogous to the variants of rDADs, rzDADs and r~DADs,
we define two variants of the sub-game rADs: ryADs (resp.
r}ADs) with pX (resp. qX ) in (8a). The optimal losses of ryADs
and r}ADs are denoted by pLu and qLu), respectively.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we focus on
case for u “ 0; i.e., no node is secured by the defender in
Stage 1. With further abuse of notation, for a strategy profile
p0, ψ, φq, we denote xp0, ψ, φq by xpψ, φq as the solution of
NPF model. Similarly, redefine pxpψ, φq and qxpψ, φq. We also
drop the superscript u from Lu, pLu and qLu.
Following the computational approach in the literature to
solve (bilevel) interdiction problems [9], [23], we define the
master-problem rADsa (resp. sub-problem rADsd) for fixed
φ P Φ (resp. fixed ψ P Ψ):
rADsa ψ‹pφq P argmaxψPΨ Lpxpψ, φqq s.t. (8),
rADsd φ‹pψq P argminφPΦ Lpxpψ, φqq s.t. (8).
Similarly, define master- and sub- problems ryADsa and
ryADsd (resp. r}ADsa and r}ADsd) for the variants ryADs (resp.
r}ADs).
§ III-A focuses on bounding the optimal loss for rADs
with the losses in ryADs and r}ADs. The master- and sub-
problems are addressed in § III-B and § III-C, respectively.
This leads to a computationally efficient iterative approach
in § III-D to solve the sub-games rADs, ryADs, r}ADs. Fig. 3
provides an outline of results in this section.
Sub-problem (Fixed ψ)
Lemma 3
Proposition 2
Master Problem (Fixed φ)
Propositions 3 to 5
Theorem 2
Algorithm 1
Theorem 3
Algorithms 2 and 3
Fixed u
Stages 2, 3
Fig. 3: Outline of technical results in § III.
A. Upper and Lower Bounds on L
Theorem 1. Let pψ‹, φ‹q, p pψ‹, pφ‹q and p qψ‹, qφ‹q be optimal
solutions to rADs, ryADs and r}ADs, respectively; and denote
the optimal losses by L, pL, qL, respectively. Then,
pL ď L ď qL` µN
2µ` 4 . (15)
To prove Theorem 1, we first state Lemmas 1 and 2, and
Proposition 1 that relates xpψ, φq, pxpψ, φq, and qxpψ, φq:
Lemma 1. Consider a fixed pψ, φq P Ψ ˆ Φ. The following
holds: sc “ psc “ qsc, sg “ psg “ qsg, andqS “ p1` qpS (16a)qν ´ ν01N “ p1` qppν ´ ν01N q (16b)
@ pi, jq P E
#
Sj “ řkPΛj sk ` zk`k (17a)pSj “ řkPΛj sk (17b)
@ j P N
$’’’’&’’’’%
pνj “ ν0 ´ 2řkPN RepZ¯jkskq (18a)qνj “ ν0 ´ 2p1` qřkPN RepZ¯jkskq (18b)pνj “ ν0 ´ 2řkPPj Repz¯k pSkq (18c)qνj “ ν0 ´ 2řkPPj Repz¯k qSkq. (18d)
Lemma 2. For a fixed pψ, φq P Ψˆ Φ,
@ pi, jq P E , Sj ď
pSj
p1´ 0qH´|Pj |`1 . (19)
Proposition 1. For a fixed strategy profile pψ, φq P Ψˆ Φ,pS ď S ď qS, pν ě ν ě qν, p`ď ` ď q`.
Hence,
LVRppxq ď LVRpxq ď LVRpqxq
LLCppxq “ LLCpxq “ LLCpqxq
LLLppxq ď LLLppxq ď LLLpqxq
,/./- ùñ Lppxq ď Lpxq ď Lpqxq. (20)
Proposition 1 implies that any attack ψ that increases pL
in ryADs (relative to the no attack case), also increases L in
rADs and qL in r}ADs, respectively. The converse need not
be true, i.e., an attack that increases L in rADs (resp. qL
in r}ADs) need not increase pL in ryADs (resp. L in rADs).
Similarly, any defender response φ that reduces qL (resp. L),
also reduces L (resp. pL). Again, the converse statements do
not apply here.
Proof of Theorem 1. For any x P X ,
LLLpxq (5c)“ ř
pi,jqPE
rjpP 2j `Q2j q
νi
pA0q1,pA0q3ď 2
µ
ř
pi,jqPE
rj
pA0q3ď µN
2µ` 4 .
(21)
Hence,qL “ qLpqxp qψ‹, qφ‹p qψ‹qqq
ě qLpqxpψ‹, qφ‹pψ‹qqq pby optimality of qψ‹q
ě qLpxpψ‹, qφ‹pψ‹qqq pby Proposition 1q
(21)ě Lpxpψ‹, qφ‹pψ‹qqq ´ µN
2µ` 4
ě Lpxpψ‹, φ‹pψ‹qqq ´ µN
2µ` 4 pby optimality of φ
‹q
“ L´ µN
2µ` 4 .
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Similarly, one can show L ě pL. 
Theorem 1 implies that the value of the sub-game rADs
with NPF can be lower (resp. upper) bounded by the value
of ryADs (resp. r}ADs). Our subsequent results show that both
ryADs and r}ADs admit computationally efficient solutions.
B. Optimal defender response to fixed attacker strategy ψ
We consider the sub-problem rADsd of computing optimal
defender response φ‹pψq for a fixed attack ψ.
The following Lemma shows that rADsd is a Second-Order
Cone Program (SOCP), and hence, can be solved efficiently.
Lemma 3. Let XCPF :“ convpX q denote the set of states x
satisfying (2)-(4), (5a), (5b), and the relaxation of (5c):
For a fixed ψ P Ψ, the problem of minimizing Lpxpψ, φqq
subject to x P XCPF, (8b), (8c) is a SOCP. Its optimal solution
is also optimal for rADsd.
For fixed ψ (attack) and fixed load control parameter γ
(e.g. when changing γ is not allowed), Proposition 2 below
provides a range of optimal defender set-points pspd‹ and qspd‹
for LPF and -LPF models, respectively. Note that, if γ is
fixed, LLCppxq is also fixed. Then, the defender set-points
can be chosen by using LVRppxq as a loss function, instead
of pLppxq. Similar argument holds for qLpqxq.
Proposition 2. If we fix γ P Γ in ryADsd, then @i P N ,
δi “ 0 ùñ
∣∣∣ pspd‹i ∣∣∣ “ spi, = pspd‹i P rarccotK, arccotKs.
Furthermore, if the DN has identical r{x ” K ratio, then
δi “ 0 ùñ
∣∣∣ pspd‹i ∣∣∣ “ spi, = pspd‹i “ arccotK. (22)
Similar results hold for r}ADsd.
C. Optimal attack under fixed defender response φ
Now, we focus on the master problem rADsa, i.e., the
problem of computing optimal attack for a fixed defender
response φ. The following Theorem characterizes the optimal
attacker set-point, denoted by spa‹i “ Repspa‹i q`jImpspa‹i q,
when δi “ 1 (i.e. DER at node i is targeted by the attacker).
Theorem 2. Consider rADsa for a fixed δ P DM (i.e., the
DERs compromised by the attacker are specified by δ and
the only decision variables in rADsa are spa). Then
@ i P N s.t. δi “ 1, spa‹i “ 0´ jspi. (23)
Same holds for both ryADsa and r}ADsa.
Proof. If δi “ 1, then pgi “xpgi “ Repspiq “ Repspa‹i q.
We first prove the simpler case for ryADsa. From (6), one
can check that as functions of xpgi, pP is strictly decreasing,pQ is constant, and pν is strictly increasing. Hence, pLpψ, φf q
is strictly increasing in xpgi (because LVR is non-decreasing
as pν is decreasing; LLC is constant). Hence, to minimize
the loss L, the attacker chooses Rep pspa‹i q “ 0. Similarly,
Imp pspa‹i q “ ´jspi. Similarly, we can show that in r}ADsa,qspa‹ “ 0´ jsp.
For the proof of spa‹ “ 0 ´ jsp, please refer to the
supplementary material at the end of the document. 
(0,−spi) =: spa∗i (when δ∗i = 1)
Re(spi)
spi
Im(spi)
Optimal attacker set-point
for [AD], [ÂD], and [AˇD]
Range of Defender
Set-points ŝpd∗ (resp. sˇpd∗)
for [ÂD] (resp. [AˇD])
when (δ∗i = 0)
 Kspi√
K2+1
, spi√
K2+1

 Kspi√
K
2+1
, spi√
K
2+1
 quadrant I
quadrant IV
Fig. 4: Optimal attacker set-points (Theorem 2) and range
for optimal defender set-points (Proposition 2).
Fig. 4 shows the optimal attacker set-point spa‹i for δ‹i “ 1,
and the defender set-points for the DERs for δ‹j “ 0.
Thanks to Theorem 2, sc and sg are determined by δ and φ
(since optimal spa‹ is given by (23)). Thus, for given pδ, φq,
loss function can be denoted as Lpxp“0´ jsp, δ‰ , φqq; and
rADs can be restated as follows:
L “ maxδPDM minφPΦ Lpxpδ, φqq s.t. (8), (23).
Same holds for ryADs (resp. r}ADs) and ryADsa (resp. r}ADsa).
Note that the attacker actions on DERs may not be limited to
an incorrect set-point attack. For example, the attacker can
simply choose to disconnect the DER nodes by choosing
spa “ 0 ` 0j. However, Theorem 2 shows that the attacker
will induce more loss to the defender by causing the DERs
to withdraw maximum reactive power rather than simply
disconnecting them.
Let ∆jppνiq (resp. ∆δppνiq) be the change in voltage at
node i caused due to compromise of DER at node j (resp.
compromise of DERs due to attack vector δ.) Similarly,
define ∆jpqνiq and ∆δpqνiq. We now state a useful result:
Lemma 4. If φ is fixed, then
@ i, j P N
#
∆jppνiq “ 2RepZ¯ijpspdj ` jspjqq (24a)
∆jpqνiq “ 2p1` qRepZ¯ijpspdj ` jspjqq (24b)
@ δ Ď DM
#
∆δppνiq “ řj:δj“1 ∆jppνiq (25a)
∆δpqνiq “ řj:δj“1 ∆jpqνiq. (25b)
For a fixed φ P Φ, let pDiMpφq be the set of optimal attack
vectors that maximize voltage bounds violation under LPF at
a pivot node, say i. Formally,
pDiMpφq :“ argmax
δPDM
Wipνi ´ pνiq s.t. pxpδ, φq P pX , (8b), (8c) (26)
Also, let pD‹Mpφq :“ ď
iPN
pDiMpφq (27)
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denote the set of candidate optimal attack vectors, and pδi PpDiMpφq denote any vector in pDiM. Similarly, define qDiMpφq,qD‹Mpφq, and qδi.
Using Lemma 4, Algorithm 1 computes optimal pδ‹ to
maximize LVR for a fixed defender action φ P Φ [20]. In
each iteration, the Algorithm selects one node as a pivot node.
For a pivot node, say i, a set of target nodes pδi is determined
by selecting M nodes with largest ∆jppνiq (see Algorithm 5
in Appendix). Applying Lemma 4, the final nodal voltage at
the current pivot node i is given by pνi´∆pδippνiq. The attack
strategy that maximizes LVR is the set pδk corresponding to a
pivot node k that admits maximum voltage bound violation
when DERs specified by pδk are compromised. Algorithm 1
repeatedly calls procedure Algorithm 5, considering each
node as the pivot node, and hence, requires Opn2 log nq time.
Algorithm 1 Optimal Attack for Fixed Defender Response
1: pδ‹pφq ÐOPTIMALATTACKFORFIXEDRESPONSE(φ)
2: procedure OPTIMALATTACKFORFIXEDRESPONSE(φ)
3: Compute state vector for no attack pxp0, φq P pX
4: for i P N do
5: pδi Ð GETPIVOTNODEOPTIMALATTACKpi, spdq, and
calculate ∆pδippνiq using Lemma. 4
6: Calculate new voltage value pν1i Ð pνi ´∆pδippνiq
7: end for
8: k Ð argmaxiPN Wipνi ´ pν1iq
9: return pδ Ð pδk (Pick pδk which maximally violates (1))
10: end procedure
11: procedure GETPIVOTNODEOPTIMALATTACK(i, spd)
12: pJ,Ngi ,m1q Ð OPTIMALATTACKHELPER(i, spd)
13: Randomly choose M´m1 nodes from Ngi to form N 1
14: return pδi P DM such that pδik “ 1 ðñ k P J YN 1
15: end procedure
The following proposition argues that Algorithm 1 com-
putes the optimal attack vectors for ryADsa and r}ADsa.
Proposition 3. For a fixed φ P Φ, if pδ is the optimal attack
vector computed by Algorithm 1, then pδ is also an optimal
attack vector of ryADsa. Same holds for r}ADsa.
We now show that the effect of DER compromise at either
node j or k on the node i depends upon the locations of nodes
j and k relative to node i. The following Proposition states
that if node j is upstream to node k relative to the pivot node
i (j ăi k), then the DER compromise at node k impacts onpνi more than the DER compromise on node j; and if j “i k,
then the effect of DER compromise at j, k on pνi is identical.
Proposition 4. [20] Consider ryADsa. Let nodes i, j, k P N
where i is the pivot node, spdj “ spdk, and spj “ spk. If
j ăi k (resp. j “i k), then ∆jppνiq ă ∆kppνiq (resp. ∆jppνiq “
∆kppνiq). Same holds true for r}ADsa.
We, now, state a result that connects the optimal attack
strategies for ryADsa and r}ADsa.
Proposition 5. For a fixed φ P Φ, the following holds:
1) The sets of candidate optimal attack vectors that max-
imizes voltage bound violations under LPF and -LPF are
identical, i.e., pD‹Mpφq ” qD‹Mpφq. (28)
2) Furthermore, assume that νi “ νj “: ν and Wi “
Wj “: W @ i, j P N . Also, let the sets of optimal attack
strategies for ryADsa and r}ADsa be denoted by pΨ‹Mpφq andqΨ‹Mpφq, respectively. Let pψ‹ P pΨ‹Mpφq and qψ‹ P qΨ‹Mpφq be
any two attack strategies. Now, if
LVRppxp pψ‹, φqq ą 0 and LVRpqxp qψ‹, φqq ą 0, (29)
then the sets of optimal attack strategies for ryADsa and
r}ADsa are identical, i.e.,pΨ‹Mpφq ” qΨ‹Mpφq. (30)
As we will see in § III-D, Proposition 5 forms the basis
of our overall computational approach.
D. A greedy approach for solving ryADs, r}ADs and rADs
We now utilize results for sub- and master-problems to
solve rADs. Consider the following assumption:
(A1) DN has identical r{x ” K ratio, i.e., @j P N ,Kj “ K.
In this subsection, we present an algorithm to solve ryADs and
r}ADs under (A0) and (A1), and then propose its extension, a
greedy iterative approach, for solving rADs under the general
case.
Under (A0) and (A1), the optimal defender set-pointspspd‹ and qspd‹ are as specified by Proposition 2, and hence
fixed. For fixed optimal pspd‹ (resp. qspd‹), we can solve the
problem ryADs (resp. r}ADs) by using Benders Cut method
[23]. However, we present a computationally faster algorithm,
Algorithm 2 that computes attacker’s candidate optimal at-
tack vectors pD‹M (resp. qD‹M) using Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. Under (A0), (A1), for any two fixed pγ1, pγ2 P Γ,pD‹Mp“ pspd‹, pγ1‰q “ pD‹Mp“ pspd‹, pγ2‰q. Same holds true for qD‹M.
Given pspd P S , it can be checked that Algorithm 2, in fact,
computes pDiMp pspdq, and pD‹Mp pspdq “ ŤiPN pDiMp pspdq is the
set of candidate optimal attack vectors. The cardinality of the
set pDiM (Line 4) in the worst-case can be as high as Opene q.
Therefore, computing pD‹M can take Opn exp pne qq time in the
worst-case.
Algorithm 2 computes the set of attacks pD‹Mp pspd‹q, and
iterates over each pδ P pD‹Mp pspd‹q. In each iteration, since
spd “ pspd‹ is fixed, the sub-problem ryADsd reduces to an
LP over the variable γ. Let pγ‹ppδq be the solution to the LP.
Then, pφ‹ppδq “ “ pspd‹, pγ‹ppδq‰ is the optimal solution to ryADsd.
Choosing pδ‹ “ argmaxpδP pD‹M Lppxppδ, pφ‹ppδqqq, Algorithm 2
computes the solution to be ppδ‹, pφ‹ppδ‹qq to the problem
ryADs. Similarly, we can use Algorithm 2 to solve r}ADs.
Theorem 3. Under (A0), (A1), let ppδ, pφq be a solution
computed by Algorithm 2. Then ppδ, pφq is also an optimal
solution to ryADs. Similar result holds for r}ADs.
Proof. Under (A1), spd “ pspd‹ is fixed (Proposition 2).
Then, for any γ P Γ, by Lemma 5 and Proposition 3, the
optimal attack pδ‹ belongs to the set pD‹Mp pspd‹q. Algorithm 2
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Algorithm 2 Solution to ryADs for DNs with identical r{x
1: ppδ‹, pφ‹, pLq Ð GREEDY-ONE-SHOT()
2: procedure GREEDY-ONE-SHOT()
3: pL “ 0, pδ‹ “ 0, pγ‹ “ 1, pspd‹ as in Proposition 2
4: Let pDiM “ GETPIVOTNODEOPTIMALATTACKSETpi, pspd‹q
5: pD‹M “ ŤiPN pDiM
6: For each pδ P pD‹M, compute pγ‹ppδq by solving ryADsd as an
LP in γ. Let pφ‹ppδq “ pspd‹, pγ‹pδqqq
7: Let pδ‹ :“ argmaxpδP pD‹M pLppxppδ, pγ‹ppδq, pspd‹qq
8: return pδ‹, pφ‹ “ pφ‹ppδ‹q, pL “ pLppxppδ‹, pφ‹qq
9: end procedure
10: procedure GETPIVOTNODEOPTIMALATTACKSET(i, spd)
11: pJ,Ngi ,m1q Ð OPTIMALATTACKHELPER(i, spd)
12: return DiM Ð tpδ P DM|pδk “ 1 iff k P J Y
N 1, where N 1 Ď Ngi and |N 1| “M ´m1u
13: end procedure
iterates over the attack vectors δ P pD‹M, computes pγ‹pδq by
solving an LP, and calculates the loss pLppxpδ, pφ‹pδqqq. Finally,
it returns the solution corresponding to the maximum loss.
Similar logic applies for optimal solution of r}ADs. 
We, now, describe an iterative greedy approach to compute
the solution to rADs that uses the optimal attacker strategy
for fixed defender response (refer Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 3 initializes φc to the optimal defender response
under no attack. In the first step of the iterative approach,
the attacker assumes some defender response φc to be fixed,
and computes the optimal attack strategy δcpφcq using the
greedy Algorithm 1. Then in the second step, the defender
computes a new defense strategy φc optimal for fixed δc
by solving the SOCP, and updates the defender response. If
Lpxpδc, φcqq ą Lpxpδ‹, φ‹qq, then the current best solution
pδ‹, φ‹q is updated to pδc, φcq. Then in the next iteration, the
attacker uses this new defender response to update his attack
strategy, and so on and so forth. If this δc has already been
discovered in some previous iteration, the algorithm termi-
nates successfully, with δ‹, φ‹ as the required optimal attack
plan, and the corresponding optimal defense. The algorithm
terminates unsuccessfully if the number of iterations exceeds
a maximum limit.
Note that in each iteration, the size of Υ increases by 1,
hence, the algorithm is bound to terminate after exhausting
all possible attack vectors.
Proposition 5 and Theorem 3 can be applied for any u P
UB , since if the DN has identical r{x ratio, spd are also fixed.
Our overall computational approach to solving the problem
rADs, thus far, can be summarized as in Fig. 5. Given an
instance of the problem rADs, we first solve the problems
ryADs and r}ADs. For this, we employ an iterative procedure
that iterates between the master- and sub- problems. For
a fixed attacker action we determine the optimal defender
response φ for the rADsd using the convex relaxation of
(5c). Then, for the fixed defender response φ, we compute
the optimal attacker strategies pψ‹ and qψ‹ by solving ryADsa
and r}ADsa, respectively. Proposition 5 provides us an useful
Algorithm 3 Iterative Algorithm for Greedy Approach
1: pδ‹, φ‹,Lq Ð GREEDY-ITERATIVE()
2: procedure GREEDY-ITERATIVE
3: Let δ‹ Ð 0,L‹ Ð 0, δc Ð 0, iter Ð 0,Υ ÐH, φc, φ‹,Υ
4: For δ “ δc, compute φ‹ by solving SOCP rADsd
(Lemma 3)
5: φc Ð φ‹,L‹ Ð Lprxpδ, φ‹qq
6: for iter Ð 0, 1, . . . ,maxIter do
7: δc Ð OPTIMALATTACKFORFIXEDRESPONSE(φc)
8: {{ If δc previously found, successfully terminate
9: if δc P Υ then return δ‹, φ‹
10: else Υ “ Υ Y tδcu {{ Store the current best attack
vector
11: Compute φc by solving SOCP rADsd Lemma 3
12: if Lprxpδc, φcqq ą L‹ then
13: δ‹ Ð δc, φ‹ Ð φc,L‹ Ð Lprxpδ, φ‹qq
14: end if
15: end for {{ Maximum Iteration Limit reached
16: Return δ‹, φ‹,L‹ {{ Return the last best solution
17: end procedure {{ Algo terminates unsuccessfully
Lower bound ryADspL “ maxψ minφ pLppxpψ, φqq
s.t. px P pX
Fixed defender actionpψ‹ “ maxψ pLppxpψ, φf qq
s.t. px P pX
Upper bound r}ADsqL “ maxψ minφ qLpqxpψ, φqq
s.t. qx P qX
Fixed defender actionqψ‹ “ maxψ qLpqxpψ, φf qq
s.t. qx P qX
rADs
L “ maxψ minφ Lpxpψ, φqq
s.t. x P X
Fixed attacker action
φ‹ “ minφ Lpxpψf , φqq
s.t. x P X
Proposition 5pΨ‹Mpφq ” qΨ‹Mpφq
φf
φf
convergence ψf
Fig. 5: Overall computational approach.
result that ψ‹pφq :“ pψ‹ “ qψ‹. This optimal attacker strategy
ψ‹pφq is then fed back to the master- problem rADsa. This
procedure is repeated until we reach a convergence or we
exceed the maximum iteration limit.
IV. SECURING DERS TO WORST-CASE ATTACKS
In this section, we consider the defender problem of opti-
mal security investment in Stage 1. For simplicity, we restrict
our attention to DNs that satisfy the following assumption:
(A2) Symmetric Network. For every i P N , for any two
nodes j, k P N ci , Λj and Λk are symmetrically identical about
node i. That is, zj “ zk,
∣∣N cj ∣∣ “ |N ck |, scnomj “ scnomk ,
νj “ νk, Wj “ Wk, and Cj “ Ck. However, all the DERs
are homogeneous, i.e., @ j, k P N , spj “ spk.
Let B be a fixed security budget. Let u, ru P UB , u ‰ ru,
be two security strategies. Strategy u is more secure than
strategy ru (denoted by u ď ru) under NPF (resp. LPF), if
Lu ď Lru (resp. pLu ď pLru). Finally, we ask what is the best
security strategy u‹, such that for u “ u‹, Lu is minimized.
Fig. 6 shows two possible security strategies u1 (Fig. 6a) and
u2 (Fig. 6b), and gives a generic security strategy (Fig. 6c).
If we compare u1 and u2, while transitioning from u1 to
strategy u2, 3 secure nodes in Λ2 subtree go up a level each,
while 3 secure nodes in Λ3 subtree go down a level each.
Then, between u1 and u2, which strategy is more secure?
In this section, we provide insights about optimal security
SECURITY OF ELECTRICTY DNS UNDER NODE COMPROMISES 11
strategies under (A2), which help show that u2 is more secure
than u1.
0
1
3
4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
2
(a) Security strategy u1.
Nspu1q “ t3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11u.
0
1
2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
(b) Security strategy u2.
Nspu2q “ t2, 4, 5, 6, 12, 14u.
b
a
i′ i′′
d
c
0Vulnerable nodes
Secure nodes
(c) A generic security strategy on a tree DN.
Fig. 6: Different defender security strategies.
Algorithm 4 computes an optimal security strategy rzDADs
under (A0)-(A2). It initially assigns all nodes to be vulnera-
ble. Then, DER nodes are secured sequentially in a bottom-up
manner towards the root node. If the security budget is not
adequate to secure a full level, the nodes in that level are
uniformly secured and the remaining nodes are not secured.
Under all the assumptions of Algorithm 4, it takes Opnq time.
Algorithm 4 Optimal security strategy
1: pu‹ ÐOPTIMALSECURITYSTRATEGY()
2: procedure OPTIMALSECURITYSTRATEGY()
3: ns Ð 0, h Ð H , pu Ð 0 {{ Initialize all nodes to
vulnerable nodes
4: For each h P r1, 2, . . . , Hs, let αh Ð řHj“h |Nj |
5: Let h1 Ð argmaxhPr1,...,Hs:αhěM h
6: Let @ h P rh1, . . . , Hs,@ i P Nh, pui Ð 1.
7: Let N 1h1 Ď Nh1 be a set of uniformly chosen M ´ αh1`1
nodes on level h1.
8: For each i P N 1h1 , pui Ð 1
9: return pu
10: end procedure
In the following theorem, we show that the security
strategy computed by Algorithm 4 is an optimal solution to
the Stage 1 of the rzDADs and r~DADs problem.
Theorem 4. Assume (A0), (A1), (A2). Let pu‹ be the security
strategy computed by Algorithm 4. Furthermore, with u “ pu‹,
let p pψ‹, pφ‹q be the solution computed by Algorithm 2. Then,
ppu‹, pψ‹, pφ‹q is an optimal solution to rzDADs. Similar result
holds for r~DADs.
Finally, we state the following result:
Proposition 6. 1) Under (A0), (A1), (A2), pD‹M can be
partitioned into at most |Nv| ď N equivalence classes of
attack vectors, one for each vulnerable node considered as
pivot node. Any two attack vectors in the same equivalence
class has identical impact on the corresponding pivot node.
Additionally, any two equivalence classes can be considered
homomorphic transformations of each other.
2) Under (A0), (A1), if @ i, j, k P N such that spj ą 0 and
spk ą 0, ∆jppνiq ‰ ∆kppνiq, then ∣∣∣ pD‹M∣∣∣ “ |Nv|, i.e., if for
any pivot node, no two DERs have identical impact on the
pivot node due to their individual DER compromises, then
each equivalence class is a singleton set, and hence, the set
for candidate optimal attack vectors is at most of size |Nv|.
By Theorem 4, we can compute the optimal security
investment pδ‹ in OpNq, and by Proposition 6, for fixedpδ‹, we can compute the optimal attacker strategy pψ‹ in
OpNq. Finally, for fixed pδ‹ and pψ‹, we can compute the
optimal defender response pφ‹ in OppolypNqq. Hence, we can
compute the optimal solution for rzDADs, in OppolypNqq.
Same holds for r~DADs.
Admittedly, our structural results on optimal security in-
vestment in Stage 1 of the game are specific to assump-
tion (A2). Future work involves extending these results to
a general radial DN with heterogeneous DER nodes. A key
aspect in effort will be to understand how the defender’s net
value of securing an individual DER node depends on its
capacity and location in the DN.
V. COMPUTATIONAL STUDY
We describe a set of computational experiments to evaluate
the performance of the iterative Greedy Approach (GA) in
solving rADs; see Algorithm 3. We again assume u “ 0. We
compare the optimal attack strategies and optimal defender
set-points obtained from GA with the corresponding solutions
obtained by conducting an exhaustive search (or Brute Force
(BF)), and by implementing the Benders Cut (BC) algorithm.
We refer the reader to [9], [23], for the BC algorithm
adopted here. The abbreviations BC-LPF and BC-NPF denote
the solutions obtained by applying optimal attack strategies
from ryADs to LPF and NPF, respectively. Importantly, the
experiments illustrate the impact of attacker’s resource (M)
and defender’s load control capability γ on the optimal value
of rADs. The code for this computational study can be
obtained by contacting the authors.
Network Description: Our prototypical DN is a modified
IEEE 37-node network; see Fig. 1. We consider two variants
of this network: homogeneous and heterogeneous. Homo-
geneous Network (GI ) has 14 homogeneous DERs with
randomly assigned node locations, loads with equal nominal
demand, and lines with identical r{x ratio. Each line has
impedance of zj “ p0.33 ` 0.38jq Ω. The nominal demand
at each node i is scnomi “ 15 kW ` j4.5 kvar. The apparent
power capability of each DER node i is spi “ 11.55 kV A.
The nominal voltage at node 0 is |V0| “ 4 kV . The cost of
load control is C “ 7 $ per kW . Heterogeneous Network
(GH ) has same topology as GI , but has heterogeneous DERs
(chosen at random from 3 different DER apparent power
capabilities), heterogeneous loads, and lines with different
r{x ratios. The locations of DER nodes, the total nominal
generation capacity, and the total nominal demand in GH is
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roughly similar to the corresponding values for GI .
DER output vs M. Fig. 7 compares the DER output (sg) of
uncompromised DERs that form part of defender response in
GI and GH for different M. When M “ 0 (no attack), there
are no voltage violations, and the defender minimizes LLL,
which results in pg ą qg. For M ą 0, the voltage bounds
may be violated. To limit LVR, the defender responds by
increasing qg; and the output of uncompromised DERs lie
in a neighborhood of θ “ arccot r{x. For the case of GH
(Fig. 7b), the set-points of the uncompromised DERs are
more spread out to achieve voltage regulation over different
r{x ratios (Proposition 2). In Fig. 7b the three semi-circles
correspond to the uncompromised DERs with different ap-
parent power capabilities. These observations on the defender
response validate Proposition 2.
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Fig. 7: Reactive power vs Real power output of DERs.
GA vs. BC-NPF, BC-LPF and BF. Fig. 8 compares results
obtained from BC-NPF, GA, and BF on GI . We consider
two cases with the maximum controllable load percentage
γ “ 50 % and γ “ 70 %. For each case, we vary M from 0
to |Nv| “ 14; and also vary W{C ratios to capture the effect
of different weights on the terms LVR and LLC.
In our study, we chose Ci “ 7 cents{kWh, converted
appropriately to the per unit system. 6 The ratio W{C “ 2
roughly corresponds to the maximum W{C ratio for which the
defender does not exercise load control, because the cost of
doing load control is too high, i.e., at optimum defender re-
sponse γ‹ “ 1N . In contrast, W{C “ 18 roughly corresponds
to the minimum W{C ratio for which the defender exercises
maximum load control (i.e. γ‹ “ γ). We also consider an
intermediate ratio, W{C “ 10.
L versus M. Both LVR and LLC are zero when there is no
attack. As M increases, one or both LVR and LLC start in-
creasing. This indicates that as more DERs are compromised,
the defender incurs LVR, and in addition, he imposes load
control to better regulate the DN. Indeed, after the false set-
points (Theorem 2) are used to compromise DERs, the net
load in the DN increases. Without load control, the voltages
6From a practical viewpoint, the weights Ci can be obtained from the
operator’s rate compensation scheme for load control. For example, North
Star Electric [24] provides a compensation of 9.1 cents to their customers
for 1 kWh of load curtailment. One can argue that the net cost of shedding
unit load should be adjusted to reflect the fact that the defender supplies
additional power during the attack to meet the consumers’ demand.
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Fig. 8: LVR and LLC vs M for GI . The results of GH are
more or less similar to those of GI .
at some nodes drop below the lower bounds, increasing LVR.
Hence, the defender exercises load control, and changes the
set-points of uncompromised DERs to limit the total loss.
Perhaps a more interesting observation is that as M in-
creases, LLC first increases rapidly but then flattens out
(Figures 8c and 8d). This can be explained as follows:
depending on the W{C ratio, there is a subset of downstream
loads that are beneficial in terms of the value that the
defender can obtain by controlling them. That is, if the
loads belonging to this subset are controlled, the decrease
in LVR outweighs the increase in LLC, hence, the defender
imposes load control on these downstream loads to reduce
the the total loss. In contrast, controlling the loads outside
this subset, increases LLC more than the decrease in LVR.
Hence, the defender satisfies the demand at these loads
fully. The LLC increases until load control capability in the
subset of beneficial downstream loads to the defender is fully
exhausted. The size of this subset depends on the W{C ratio.
The higher the ratio, the larger the size of the subset of the
loads beneficial to the defender. Hence, the value of M, at
which the LLC cost curve flattens out, increases as the W{C
ratio increases.
The cost curve for LVR also shows interesting behavior as
the number of compromised DER nodes increases (Figures 8a
and 8b). The marginal increase in LVR for every additional
DER compromised reduces as M increases. This observation
can be explained by the fact that the attacker prefers to
compromise downstream nodes over upstream ones (Propo-
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sition 4). Initially, the attacker is able to rapidly increase L
by compromising more beneficial downstream nodes. How-
ever, as the downstream nodes are eventually exhausted, the
attacker has to target the relatively less beneficial upstream
nodes. Hence, the reduction in marginal increase of LVR.
In LVR plots, for small M, W{C “ 2 curves are lower than
the W{C “ 10 curves which in turn are lower than the W{C “
18 curves. But, for larger M, this order reverses. The M where
these lines cross each other decreases, as the γ increases (see
Figures 8a and 8b). The reason is for some intermediate value
of M, the defender exhausts the load control completely, and
then the L increases at rates in the same order of increasing
W{C values.
Our computational study also validates that the GA is more
efficient than BC method because GA calculates the exact
impact the DER compromises will have on a pivot node. In
contrast, BC overestimates the impact of DER compromises
that are not the ancestors to the pivot nodes. Therefore, the
feasible region probed by BC at every iteration is larger than
the feasible region probed in the corresponding iteration of
GA. Hence, although GA converges to a solution in 2-3
iterations, BC in most cases does not converge to the optimal
solution even in 200 iterations.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We focused on the security assessment of radial DNs for an
adversary model in which multiple DERs (in this case, DER
nodes) are compromised. The adversary can be a threat agent,
who can compromise the operation of DERs, or a malicious
insider in the control center. We considered a composite loss
function that primarily accounts for the attacker’s impact on
voltage regulation and induced load control. The security
assessment problem is formulated as a three-stage Defender-
Attacker-Defender (rDADs) sequential game. Our main tech-
nical contributions include: (i) Approximating the rDADs
game that has nonlinear power flow model and mixed-integer
decision variables with tractable formulations based on linear
power flow; and (ii) characterization of structural properties
of security investments in Stage 1 and the optimal attack in
Stage 2 (i.e., the choice of DER node locations and the choice
of false set-points).
Future work includes: (a) Extending Theorems 1 and 2
to cases where reverse power flows are permissible (e.g.,
when the DN is not under heavy loading conditions and the
attacker can cause DER generation to exceed the demand);
(b) Designing greedy algorithm to solve [AD] and proving
optimality guarantees of Theorems 3 and 4 for DNs with
heterogeneous r{x ratio, and heterogeneous DERs or loads.
Finally, note that we do not consider cascading failures
in our paper. However, our analysis can be extended to a
form of cascading failures within DNs reported by Kundu
and Hiskens [25]. They study synchronous tripping of the
loads (specifically, plug-in electric vehicles chargers) leading
to over-voltages in the DN. Our result on optimal DER attack
can be used to create voltage violations at some nodes. If
these violations are too high, certain loads may start to trip.
After sufficiently large number of loads trip, the attacker
can further manipulate the DER setpoints to their maximum
power generation capacity. In the absence of new loads, this
may lead to overvoltages, as described in [25].
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APPENDIX
For a pivot node i P N , Algorithm 5 computes a sequence
of sets of nodes in decreasing order of ∆jppνiq values.
This sequence is used to compute the optimal attacks that
maximize voltage bounds violation at node i.
Algorithm 5 Helper procedure
1: procedure OPTIMALATTACKHELPER(i, pspd)
2: For each j P N compute ∆jppνiq using Lemma 4
3: Create a sequence of sets tN ij uNj“1 such that
i) N “ ŤNj“1N ij , @ 1 ď j, k,ď N, N ij XN ik “ H
ii) if 1 ď l ď N, j, k P N il , then ∆jppνiq “ ∆kppνiq, and
iii) if 1 ď l ă m ď N, j P N il , k P N im, then ∆jppνiq ą
∆kppνiq.
4: Let, for j P r1, . . . , N s,mij Ð
∣∣N ij ∣∣, M ij :“ řj´1k“1mik.
5: Let gi Ð argminjPr1,...,Ns,MijěM j.
6: J Ð Ťgi´1j“1 , Ngi , m1 “M ´M igi´1
7: return J , Ngi , m1
8: end procedure
j j “ ?´1 complex square root of -1
Network parameters
N set of nodes
E set of edges
G tree topology G “ pN , Eq
rj resistance of line pi, jq P E
xj reactance of line pi, jq P E
zj impedance zj “ rj ` jxj of line pi, jq P E
H height of the tree
Nh set of nodes on level h P 1, 2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , H
hi level of node i
N ci set of children nodes of node i
Λi subtree rooted at node i P N
Λji subtree rooted at node i P N until level hj for j P Λi
Pi path from the root node to node i
Zij Zij :“ řkPPiXPj zk common path impedances be-
tween nodes i and j
Power flow notations
NPF Nodal quantities of node i P N LPF -LPF
scnomi complex power demand at node i ´ ´
sci complex power consumed at node i psci qsci
sgi complex power generated at node i xsgi |sgi
spi complex power set-point of DER i pspi qspi
Vi complex voltage at node i pVi qVi
νi square of voltage magnitude at node i pνi qνi
νi, νi soft lower and upper bounds on square
of voltage magnitude at node i
NPF Edge quantities of edge pi, jq P E LPF -LPF
Sj complex power flowing on line pi, jq pSi qSi
Ij complex current flowing on line pi, jq pIi qIi
`j square of magnitude of current Ij p`i q`i
x x “ pν, `, sc, sg, Sq - state vector px qx
Attacker model
δi δi “ 1 if DER i is compromised ´ ´
spai attacker set-point of DER i pspai qspai
ψ ψ :“ pspa, δq attacker strategy pψ qψ
Defender model
γ
i
max. allowed fraction of load control ´ ´
γi fraction of load control at load i pγi qγi
spdi defender set-point of DER i pspdi qspdi
φ φ :“ pspd, γq defender strategy pφ qφ
TABLE II: Table of Notations.
Devendra Shelar is pursuing his Ph.D. at the Cen-
ter for Computational Engineering (CCE), Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). He is in-
terested in developing tools using large-scale opti-
mization and game theory to improve the resiliency
of cyber-physical systems to failures. His current
focus is on the secure and efficient operation of
power systems with high penetration of distributed
energy resources. He received his Dual B.Tech.
& M.Tech. in Computer Science and Engineering
from the Indian Institute of Technology Bombay
in 2012, M.S. in Transportation Engineering from MIT in 2016.
SECURITY OF ELECTRICTY DNS UNDER NODE COMPROMISES 15
Saurabh Amin is Robert N. Noyce Career De-
velopment Assistant Professor in the Department
of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). His re-
search focuses on the design and implementation
of high confidence network control algorithms for
infrastructure systems. He works on robust diag-
nostics and control problems that involve using
networked systems to facilitate the monitoring and
control of large-scale critical infrastructures, in-
cluding transportation, water, and energy distribu-
tion systems. He also studies the effect of security attacks and random faults
on the survivability of networked systems, and designs incentive-compatible
control mechanisms to reduce network risks. Dr. Amin received his Ph.D. in
Systems Engineering from the University of California, Berkeley in 2011.
He is a recipient of NSF CAREER award, and Google Faculty Research
award.
16 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CONTROL OF NETWORK SYSTEMS
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Proof of Lemma 1. Recursively apply the power flow mod-
els (5), (6), and (12), from the root node to leaf nodes. 
Proof of Lemma 2. We apply induction from leaf nodes to
the root node. Base case: For any leaf node k P NL,
zk`k
pA0q4ď 0Sk (17a)“ 0psk ` zk`kq
6 zk`k ď 0sk
1´ 0
(17b)“ 0 pSk
1´ 0 .
Now, for any j P N zNL,
zj`j
pA0q4ď 0Sj (5a)“ 0
“ř
k:pj,kqPE Sk ` sj ` zj`j
‰
6 zj`j ď 0
1´ 0
“ř
k:pj,kqPE Sk ` sj
‰
.
Adding
ř
Sk ` sj on both the sides:ř
k:pj,kqPE Sk ` sj ` zj`jlooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooon
Sj
ď 1
1´ 0
“ř
k:pj,kqPE Sk ` sj
‰
.
Inductive step: By inductive hypothesis (IH) on N cj ,
Sj
(IH)ď 1p1´ 0qH´|Pk|`2
“ř
k:pj,kqPE pSk ` sj‰
“ pSjp1´ 0qH´|Pj |`1 p7 |Pj | “ |Pk|´ 1q.

Proof of Proposition 1. The inequalities pS ď S and pν ě ν
are proved in [26].
The rest of the proof of Proposition 1 utilizes two lemmas.
From Lemma 2, for any pi, jq P E ,
Sj ď
pSj
p1´ 0qH´|Pj |`1 ď
pSj
p1´ 0qH “ p1` q
pSj (16a)“ qSj .
(31)
For nodal voltages,
νj
(5b)“ νi ´ 2Repz¯jSjq ` |z|2j `j
ě νi ´ 2Repz¯jSjq
(31)ě νi ´ 2Repz¯j qSjq. (32)
Applying (32) recursively from the node j till root node:
νj ě ν0 ´ 2řkPPj Repz¯k qSkq (18d)“ qνj .
Thus, pSj ď Sj ď qSj and pνj ě νj ě qνj . Furthermore,
pSj ď Sj ď qSj pA0q2ùñ ∣∣∣pSj∣∣∣2 ď |Sj |2 ď ∣∣∣qSj∣∣∣2
ùñ
∣∣∣pSj∣∣∣2pνj ď |Sj |
2
νj
ď
∣∣∣qS∣∣∣2qνj ùñ p`ď ` ď q`.
Finally, (20) immediately follows from (9), (10), and (15).

Proof of Lemma 3. Let rĄADsd denote the following prob-
lem:
rĄADsd rφ‹pψq P argmin
φPΦ
Lpxpψ, φqq
s.t. pxpu, ψ, φq P XCPF, (8b), (8c). (33)
pA0q1 implies that a feasible solution exists for rADsd.
Since, X Ă XCPF, a feasible solution rx P XCPF also exists for
rĄADsd.
Let prφ, r`q denote the decision variables for rĄADsd. Note
that, for a fixed ψ, rx is affine in the variables prφ, r`q, and can
be very efficiently computed using (5a) and (5b).
Now, L is convex in rφ (because the LVR is a maximum
over affine functions, LLC is affine in rφ, and LLL is affine inr`. Also, Φ is a convex compact set. Further, for a fixed φ, L
is strictly increasing in r` (because, LVR is non-decreasing inr`as rν is affine decreasing in r`; LLC does not change with r`;
LLL is strictly increasing in `). From Theorem 1 [21], prφ‹, r`‹q
can be computed using a SOCP. To argue that r`‹ satisfy
(5c), assume for contradiction that D pi, jq P E , s.t. r`‹j ą∣∣∣ rS‹j ∣∣∣2{rν‹i . Then, construct pφ‹, r`1q such that @ j P N : j ‰
i, r`1j “ r`‹j , and r`1i “ ∣∣∣ rS‹j ∣∣∣2{rν‹i . Since @ pj, kq P E , ∣∣∣ rSk∣∣∣2{rνj
is strictly decreasing in r`i, @ pj, kq P E : r`1k ě ∣∣∣ rS‹k∣∣∣2{rν‹j ą∣∣∣ rS1k∣∣∣2{rν1j . Hence, one can further minimize the loss function
by choosing a new feasible solution pφ‹, r`1q, thus violating
the optimality of prφ‹, r`‹q. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let pdi, θiq denote pspdi in the polar
coordinates, i.e., di “
∣∣∣ pspdi ∣∣∣ , θi “ = pspdi .
For δi “ 0, pspi “ pspdi . Then from (18a), @ j P N ,pνj “ pν1j ` 2dipRij cos θi `Xij sin θiq, (34)
where pν1j “ ν0 ´ 2řkPN ,k‰jRepZ¯jkskq ´ 2RepZ¯ijscjq.
Note that pν1j does not depend on pdi, θiq.
It is clear from (34) that pνj is greater if θi P r0, pi{2s than
if θi P r´pi{2, 0s. Furthermore, the impedances are positive.
Hence, @ j, Bdipνj “ 2pRij cos θi ` Xij sin θiq ą 0. Hence,
BdiLVR ą 0. But, from (4), di ď spi. Hence, d‹i “ spi.
Further, Bθipνj “ 2dip´Rij sin θi `Xij cos θiq.
Bθipνj
$’&’%
ą 0 if θi P r0, arccotpRij{Xijqq
“ 0 if θi “ arccotpRij{Xijqq
ă 0 if θi P parccotpRij{Xijqq, pi{2s
Now, arccotK ď arccotpXij{Rijq ď arccotK. Hence,
@ j P N , Bθipνj
#
ă 0 if θi ą arccotK
ą 0 if θi ă arccotK (35)
Suppose, for contradiction, θ‹i R rarccotK, arccotKs. Hold-
ing all else equal, for θi “ rθi, let pνprθiq and LVRprθiq be thepν and LVR. From (35), for any rθi P rarccotK, arccotKs,pνprθiq ą pνprθ‹i q. Since, LVR ą LLL ě 0, LVRprθiq ă LVRprθ‹i q,
violating the optimality of rθ‹i . Furthermore, under identical
r{x ratio, K “ K “ K, which implies θi “ arccotK. 
Claim 1. Theorem 2 also holds for rADsa.
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Proof. Now, we prove the case for rADsa by contradiction.
Suppose that there exists i P N s.t. Repspa‹i q ą 0. Then we
can construct another attacker strategy rψ‹ “ rrδ, rspas that can
further maximize L, such that Repspa‹i q “ 0, holding all else
equal, i.e., rδ “ δ,@ j P N , Imp rspaj q “ Impspa‹j q,@ j P N :
j ‰ i, Rep rspaj q “ Repspa‹j q.
Let pspa, `q be the decision variables for rADsa, as for
fixed φ, the other decision variables P,Q, ν can then be
written as affine functions of pspa, `q from (5). Let pspa‹, `‹q
(resp. p rspa, r`q) be the solution to rADsa when ψ “ ψ‹ (resp.
ψ “ rψ).
Let f P RN` such that, for any pi, jq P E , fjpspa, `q :“
P 2j `Q2j
νi
. Let f‹ “ fpspa‹, `‹q, f 1 “ fp rspa, `‹q, and rf “
fp rspa, r`q.
Since pspa‹, `‹q and p rspa, r`q are solutions to rADsa, they
satisfy (5c). Hence, f‹ “ `‹, and rf “ r`. Furthermore, it
can be checked that f 1 ą f‹. We want to show that rf ą
f 1. Assume that rf ą f 1. Then, rf ą f‹. Hence, Lprxq ą
Lpx‹q, (because, LVRprxq ą LVRpx‹q, LLCprxq “ LLCpx‹q,
LLLprxq ą LLLpxq). However, this is a contradiction, as it
violates the optimality of spa‹. By similar logic, we can show
that @ i P N , Impspa‹i q “ ´spi.
We now prove that rf ą f 1, with the help of an illustrative
diagram (see Fig. 9).
ℓ
y
y = f (Re(spa∗), ℓ)
y = f (Re(s˜pai ), ℓ)
y = ℓ
(f ∗, ℓ∗)
(f˜ , ℓ˜)
(0,1)
(0,0) (1,0)
(f ′, ℓ∗)
Fig. 9: Illustrative diagram showing how ` changes with spa
Note that from (5), one can show that for any `,
fpRep rspa, `qq ą fpRepspa‹, `qq. Now, consider the pj, kqth
entry of Jacobian Jf p`q.
B`kfj “
νi
`
2PjB`kPj ` 2QjB`kQj
˘
ν2i
´ pP
2
j `Q2j qB`kνi
ν2i
6 0
(A2)ď B`kfj
(A3)ă p2rk ` 2xkq
νi
` p4Rikrk ` 4Xikxkq
ν2i
ùñ 0 ď B`kfj
(A3)ă prk ` xkqp2{µ` 4{µ2q ď 1
ùñ 0 ď B`kfj ă 1.
At ` “ 0, f ą 0, and each entry of Jacobian Jf p`q is
positive and smaller than 1. Hence, f intersects the hyper-
plane y “ `, exactly once. Furthermore, fpRep rspa, `qq ą
fpRepspa‹, `qq. Hence, we can conclude that r`“ rf ą f 1 ą
f‹ “ `‹. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Note that for fixed φ P Φ, maximiz-
ing pLppxppδ, φqq (resp. qLpqxppδ, φqq) is equivalent to maximizing
LVRppxppδ, φqq (resp. LVRpqxpqδ, φqq). Let pδ‹ be the optimal
solution to ryADsa.
Case (i). LVRppxppδ‹, φqq “ 0. Then Algorithm 1 computespδ‹ trivially, because LVRppxppδ‹, φqq ě LVRppxppδ, φqq ě 0.
Hence, LVRppxppδ, φqq “ LVRppxppδ‹, φqq “ 0.
Case (ii). LVRppxppδ‹, φqq ą 0. Let pνjpδ, φq denote the
nodal voltage at node j after the attack δ. Since, pδ “ pδk ,
for some pivot node k P N (see Algorithm 1), pδk maximally
violates (1) over all pδi, i.e.,
@ i P N , νk ´ pνkppδk, φq ě νi ´ pνippδi, φq, (36)
where pδi is the optimal pivot node attack as computed by
Algorithm 1 for node i, i.e.,
@ i P N , @ δ P DM νi ´ pνippδi, φq ě νi ´ pνipδ, φq. (37)
Let i “ argmaxjPN Wjpνj´pνjppδ‹, φqq`. Furthermore, since
LVRppxppδ‹, φqq ą 0,
LVRppxppδ‹, φqq “Wipνi ´ pνippδ‹, φqq (38)
6 LVRppxppδ, φqq “ LVRppxppδk, φqq
(10a)“ maxjPN Wjpνj ´ pνjppδk, φqq`
(36)ě Wipνi ´ pνippδi, φqq
(37)ě Wipνi ´ pνippδ‹, φqq
(38)“ LVRppxppδ‹, φqq.
Furthermore, for a fixed φ LLCppxppδ, φqq “ LLCppxppδ‹, φqq.
Hence, pLppxppδ, φqq ě pLppxppδ‹, φqq. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Let spj be the DER set-point of node
j before the attack. If spj is the pre-attack set-point, let
∆jpspjq denote the change in the set-point of DER j after
it is compromised. By Theorem 2, ∆pspjq “ spj ´ spaj “
spj ´ p0´ jspjq “ spj ` jspj ; and by linearity in (18a),
∆jpνiq “ 2RepZ¯ij∆jpspjqq “ 2RepZ¯ijpspdj ` jspjqq.
Again, by invoking the linearity in (18a), (25a) follows.
Similarly, one can show (24b) and (25b). 
Proof of Lemma 5. The computation of pD‹Mpφq depends on
∆jppνiq values which depend only on spd, and not on pγ (see
Lemma 4). 
Proof of Proposition 4. When δj “ 1, i.e., the DER j is
compromised, only the power supplied at node j changes.
Using (24a), we get,
6 ∆jppνiq “ 2RepZ¯ij∆pspdj qq
“ 2RepZ¯ijpspdj ` jspjqq.
Now, j ăi k ùñ Pi X Pj Ă Pi X Pk ùñ Zij ă Zik.
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6 ∆jppνiq “ 2RepZ¯ijpspdj ` jspjqq
ă 2RepZ¯ikpspdk ` jspkqq “ ∆kppνiq
Similarly, we can prove the case for j “i k.
Under the -LPF model, ∆jpqνiq “ 2p1`qRepZ¯ijpspdj`jspjqq.
The rest of the proof follows similarly. 
Remark 1. Proposition 4 implies that, broadly speaking,
compromising downstream DERs is advantageous to the at-
tacker than compromising the upstream DERs. The following
illustrative example suggests that compromising DERs by
means of clustered attacks are more beneficial to the attacker
than distributed attacks.
Example 1. Consider the ryADsa with M “ 2 instantiated
on the DN in Fig. 2. Assume that all loads and DERs
are homogeneous, all lines have equal impedances, i.e.,
@i P N , sci “ sca, spdi “ spda, spi “ spa, zi “ za. By
Proposition 2, the outputs of all the DERs are fixed and
identical to each other.
Let α “ 2pRepz¯apsca ´ spdaqqq, and β “
2pRepz¯apRepspdaq` jpImpspdaq` spaqqqq. Then ν values for
different attack vectors are given in Table III. The optimal
attack compromises nodes i and m, which is a cluster
attack.
Attacked Nodes νm νj νk
H ν0 ´ 23α ν0 ´ 13α ν0 ´ 20αti,mu ν0 ´ 23α ´ 9β ν0 ´ 13α ´ 2β ν0 ´ 20α ´ 4βtj,mu ν0 ´ 23α ´ 6β ν0 ´ 13α ´ 4β ν0 ´ 20α ´ 3βtk,mu ν0 ´ 23α ´ 7β ν0 ´ 13α ´ 2β ν0 ´ 20α ´ 6βtg, ju ν0 ´ 23α ´ 2β ν0 ´ 13α ´ 5β ν0 ´ 20α ´ 2βtd, ku ν0 ´ 23α ´ 4β ν0 ´ 13α ´ 2β ν0 ´ 20α ´ 7β
TABLE III: ν vs Different Attack Combinations.
Consequently, our results (see § IV) on security strategy
in Stage 1 show that the defender should utilize his security
strategy to deter cluster attacks.
Proof of Proposition 5. For a fixed defender action φ, we
have from (16b) that @ j P N ,∆jpqνiq “ p1 ` q∆jppνiq.
Hence, the sequence of partitions of the nodes for every pivot
node is the same in both the LPF and the -LPF model.
Hence, pD‹Mpφq “ qD‹Mpφq.
Now, for any ψ1, ψ2 P Ψ,
LLCppxpψ1, φqq “ LLCppxpψ2, φqq and
LLCpqxpψ1, φqq “ LLCpqxpψ2, φqq. (39)
Suppose pψ‹ is not an optimal solution to r}ADsa. Then,qLpqxp qψ‹, φqq ą qLpqxp pψ‹, φqq
(39)ðñ LVRpqxp qψ‹, φqq ą LVRpqxp pψ‹, φqq
ðñ max
iPN Wipνi ´ qνip qψ‹, φqq` ą maxjPN Wjpνj ´ qνjp pψ‹, φqq`
(29)ðñ max
iPN pν ´ qνip qψ‹, φqq ą maxjPN pν ´ qνjp pψ‹, φqq
ðñ max
iPN pν0 ´ qνip qψ‹, φqq ą maxjPN pν0 ´ qνjp pψ‹, φqq
(16b)ðñ p1` q
∥∥∥pν0 ´ pνip qψ‹, φqq∥∥∥8 ą p1` q∥∥∥pν0 ´ pνjp pψ‹, φqq∥∥∥8
(29)ðñ max
iPN Wipνi ´ pνip qψ‹, φqq` ą maxjPN Wjpνj ´ pνjp pψ‹, φqq`
ðñ LVRppxp qψ‹, φqq ą LVRppxp pψ‹, φqq
(39)ðñ pLppxp qψ‹, φqq ą pLppxp pψ‹, φqq.
Hence, the contradiction that pψ‹ is an optimal solution to
ryADsa. Similarly, we can show that qψ‹ is an optimal solution
to r}ADsa. 
To prove Theorem 4, we first introduce Propositions 7 to 9.
Consider any security strategy u P UB such that
u “
„
u1
1
u2
2
. . . 1
a
. . . 0
b
. . . uN
N

. (40)
Construct ru from u by only flipping the bits at nodes a and
b as follows:
ru “ „u1
1
u2
2
. . . 0
a
. . . 1
b
. . . uN
N

, (41)
i.e., rui “ ui @ i P N zta, bu. Similarly, let δ P DMpuq
such that δa “ 0, δb “ 1; and construct rδ from δ as in (41)
such that rδi “ δi @ i P N zta, bu. Note that, rδ P DMpruq.
We use Propositions 7 to 9 to compare the security
strategies u and ru under various conditions. Refer to Fig. 6c
for the purpose of proofs of Propositions 7 to 9.
Proposition 7. Assume (A0), (A1), (A2). Let u P UB (resp.ru P UB) be as in (40) (resp. (41)). If b P Λa, then u ď ru.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let pδ‹, φ‹q and prδ‹, rφ‹q, denote
the optimal solutions of ryADs with u “ pu (resp. u “ ru). (A1)
ùñ spd‹ is fixed (Proposition 2). Hence, φ‹ depends only
on δ‹, and not u. Then, let φ‹pδq denote optimal defender
response to δ. We want to show pLru ď pLu.
Case rδ‹a “ 0. Then rδ‹ P DMpuq. Thus,pLru “ pLppxpru, rδ‹, φ‹prδ‹qqq
“ pLppxpu, rδ‹, φ‹prδ‹qqq
ď pLppxpu, δ‹, φ‹pδ‹qqq,
where the inequality follows due to the optimality of δ‹.
Case rδ‹a “ 1. Let δ P DMpuq : δa “ 0, δb “ 1,@i P
N zta, bu, δi “ rδ‹i . We have assumed that b P Λa; see Fig. 6c.
Therefore, @ i P N , a ĺi b. Hence, by Proposition 4,
@ i P N , ∆bppνiq ě ∆appνiq.
Then, by Lemma 4, for fixed φ, ∆δppνq ě ∆rδ‹ppνq. Hence,pLru “ pLppxpru, rδ‹, φ‹prδ‹qqq
ď pLppxpru, rδ‹, φ‹pδqqq
ď pLppxpu, δ, φ‹pδqqq
ď pLppxpu, δ‹, φ‹pδ‹qqq
“ pLu.
Here, the first (resp. last) inequality follows due to optimality
of φ‹prδ‹q (resp. δ‹). Hence, u ď ru. 
Remark 2. Starting with any strategy u1 P UB , Proposition 7
can be applied recursively to obtain a more secure strategy
u P UB : u1 ď u, which has the property that if a node i is
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secure, then all its successor nodes (i.e. all nodes in subtree
Λi) are also secured by the defender, i.e.,
@ i P N , ui “ 1 ùñ @ j P Λi, uj “ 1. (42)
Proposition 8. Assume (A0), (A1), (A2). Let u P UB (resp.ru P UB) be as in (40) (resp. (41)). Let Au “ tpi, jq P N ˆ
N | ui “ 1, uj “ 0, hi ě hj ` 1u. If u satisfies (42), and
pa, bq P argmaxpi,jqPAu |Pi X Pj |, then u ď ru.
Proof of Proposition 8. Let c “ argmaxpiPPaXPbq hi, be
the lowest common ancestor of a and b. Let i1, i2 P N cc :
a P Λi1 and b P Λi2 . From Theorem 3, we know that the
optimal attack δ‹ will be a pivot node attack pδi for some
node, say i P N . Let N 1 “ Λi1 Y Λi2 .
Case i P N 1. Now uj “ 1 @ j P Λi1zΛai1 Y tau by maxi-
mality of |Pa X Pb|. Similarly, uj “ 0 @ j P Λdi2Ytbu. Thus,@ j P Λi1 s.t. uj “ 0 there exists a separate node k P Λi2
such that j and k are homomorphic, and uk “ 0 (see Fig. 6c).
Hence, the subtree Λi2 is more vulnerable than the subtree
Λi1 , and it will be more beneficial for the attacker to target
a pivot node in Λi2 . Now, i P Λi2 , and @ i P Λi2 , a ăi b.
Hence, by using Proposition 4, we get, ∆appνiq ă ∆bppνiq.
Case i R N 1. Then a “i b, and by Proposition 4, we have
∆appνiq “ ∆bppνiq.
We now want to show that pLru ď pLu. The rest of the proof
is similar to the proof of Proposition 7. 
Remark 3. Again, starting with any strategy u1 P UB , we
can apply Proposition 8 recursively to obtain a more secure
strategy u P UB : u1 ď u, in which, if a node is secure, then
all nodes in lower levels are also secured by the defender,
i.e.,
@ i, j P N , pui “ 1 and hj ą hiq ùñ uj “ 1. (43)
Thus, Proposition 8 is a generalization of Proposition 7.
Proposition 9. Assume (A0), (A1), (A2). Let u P UB be such
that u satisfies (43). Let h1 “ argminpD aPNh:ua“1q h. If the
secure nodes on level h1 are uniformly distributed over the
level h1, i.e.,
∣∣N cj XNs∣∣ P tT, T ` 1u, @ j P Nh1 , where
T P Z`, then u is an optimal security strategy, i.e., @ ru P
UB , ru ď u.
Proof of Proposition 9. Similar to the proof of Proposi-
tion 8. 
Remark 4. Proposition 9 implies that there exists an optimal
security strategy in which there is a top-most level with DER
nodes that are uniformly chosen for security investment, while
all the lower levels are fully secure.
Propositions 7 and 8 capture the attacker preference for
the downstream DERs, whereas Proposition 9 capture the
attacker preference for cluster attacks. Hence, the optimal
security strategy has distributed secured nodes.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let u‹1 P UB be any optimal security
strategy. From u‹1, by sequentially applying Proposition 7,
Proposition 8, and Proposition 9, we can obtain an optimal
security strategy u‹2 that satisfies (42), (43), and has the top-
most level with secure nodes having uniformly distributed
secured nodes.
Now, let pu‹ be the output of Algorithm 4. Since in
Algorithm 4, nodes are secured from the leaf nodes to the
root node level-by-level, pu‹ also satisfies (42) and (43). The
Algorithm 4 also secures the top-most level with secure nodes
with uniformly distributed secured nodes, pu‹ is the same as
u‹2 upto a homomorphic transformation.
Finally, we argue that under (A0)-(A2), pu‹ can be com-
bined with previous results to obtain full solution of rzDADs.
Under (A1), the defender set-points are fixed. Since, pu andpspd‹ are both fixed, we can compute the set of candidate
optimal attack vectors pD‹M, by considering only vulnerable
DERs. Then for a fixed δ P pD‹M, the sub-problem ryADsd
reduces to an LP in γ. Hence, Algorithm 2 solves for
p pψ‹, pφ‹q, the optimal solution of ryADs for u “ pu, by iterating
over δ P pD‹M. The strategy profile ppu‹, pψ‹, pφ‹q, thus obtained,
is an optimal solution to for DNs that satisfy (A0), (A1),
(A2). Similarly, we can solve r~DADs. 
Remark 5. We revisit the security strategies u1 and u2 in
Fig. 6: which one is better? Firstly, we use symmetricity (A2)
to argue that securing nodes 2, 4, 5 is equivalent to securing
nodes 3, 6, 7. Then, Λ3 subtree of u2 has more distributed
secured nodes than Λ2 in u1. Hence, strategy 2 is better.
Theorem 4 will, of course, give the optimal security strategypu‹ in which nodes Nsppu‹q “ t8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14u, or other
homomorphic strategies of pu‹.
